to begin with, hegel. i shal leave you to discover who is was (haha!) and what
really was his philosophy, and right to the heart of the matter. in his
phenomenology (the obvious lack of capitalization is not a bid on my part to imitate bell hooks. far from it. in fact i believe capitalization, along with most of the english language's other idiosyncrasies, has its proper time and place. it's just that i am lazy. now, to return.) as i was saying, in
phenomenology, hegel employs an investigational approach that is now widely known (and mis-known) as the dialectical method. as kierkegaard puts it, this is to understand a position/phenomenon/concept etc. by examining difference. the object and the "not" object, "not" used only most loosely in this regard to express difference, oppostion. the self, then, for hegel can be defined only by looking at what is "not" the self, what lies outside the self, what is an "other" to the self. (again, please do me the honour of not taking a monologic view of "not.")
the logic of the argument becomes somewhat clear after one accepts the foundation of reason that hegel adopts. (although, i am sorry to say, the language remains stubbornly inaccessible.) consciousness, which is not yet a self, needs to become a self consciousness to indeed be called a self. hegel charts for it a logical progression, which is also, and here i believe necessarily, a teleological one. this "consciousness" first sensually perceives the "objects" that surround it. at this stage, it is not yet aware of its own subjecthood, let alone the subjecthood of the "objects." hence the terminology.
hegel argues that this process of perceiving soon exhausts itself and leads to an impasse. the consciousness can no longer be a passive observer and now feels the need to actively engage with the world/objects. for hegel, the form that this engagement takes is that of desire.
here i must make a note to avoid charges of oversimplification, and indeed, misinterpretation. although, i do not believe that a text can ever be "wrongly" read, but that is another story. anyway, what i wish to say is that i am indeed skipping over large portions of his thesis and presenting only the emaciated skeleton. just the top of the top of the iceberg. to learn more, please feel free to read the text.
the way this desire is expressed by the consciousness is hardly a unique one, if you keep in mind the reactions of a very young child. (the analogy itself introduces further complications, but think of this as merely an example. it gets tiresome to keep typing "the consciousness." consider this my creative input.) the child desires the object that is before him/her, say a block of clay, and it manifests its desire by trying to consume/destroy the block. (again, not literally, please.) consciousness, too, desires an object and thus destroys it by consuming etc. after it has destroyed the first block, it must then transfer its desire to another object, which it must then destroy and ad infinitum.
the ability to express desire lets the consciousness know of its unique subjecthood. after all, it has identified itself as being "different" from the objects that it consumes. hegel grants the consciousness the status of a "self" consciousness, as it can now perceive difference. however, even now, this knowledge has no universal validity as the consciousness cannot find any external proof to confirm its unique existence.
the problems are obvious. and also, here the logic of the argument fails, and so hegel moves on. he then describes the meeting between two self consciousnesses. as kojeve says, let this be the meeting between the first two men. (oh sod off you feminists/gender equalists. too much work.) each self consciousness perceives the "other" as another self consciousness. the significance of the statement is that this "other" is no longer a mere object. rather, it is a self consciousness, much like the one that perceives.
this leads to the next impasse. self consciousness, in the hegelian frame of logic, needs to establish itself as unique, for it to have any validity. it needs to prove its unique existence. in order to do this, the self consciousness must be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice--it must be willing to destroy itself, its existence. paradoxical, yet necessary. after all, if you can't put your life at stake for the recognition that you seek from your "other," then that recognition cannot be of supreme importance to you.
now, like the one self consciousness desires recognition, so does the other. and so ensues the famous "battle unto death" described by hegel. both self consciousnesses stake their most precious possession--their selves--to win the most important battle. with both self consciousnesses engaged in this mortal combat (forgive the pun), the result is logically obvious. one of them has to win. the winning self consciousness is the master, says hegel, while the self consciousness that loses this battle is the slave.
here comes one of the crucial paradoxes. (what an idiotic statement. all of hegel's paradoxes are crucial. if they were mine then they would be just that, paradoxes.) in this battle to death, if one self consciousness dies, then it defeats both its own and its"other's" purpose. if it dies, it ceases to have an existence, and therefore no unique existence is possible. also, if the self consciousness dies (i.e. it is destroyed by its "other") then who is to provide the recognition that the remaining self consciousness seeks? with the "other" gone, the self consciousness can have no proof to validate its theory of unique existence and hence it is back to square one. so it is imperative for both consciousnesses to be alive. one the master, the other the slave.
apparently, the self consciousness that is the master occupies a superior position. it has engaged in a fight to death and has emerged victorious. it has reduced the "other" slavish self consciousness to the position of a "object" by expressing desire and consuming it. the slave self consciousness is bound to fulfill the desires of its master.
the slave, on the other hand, has surrendered its unique existence by succumbing to its "other." the defeat has resulted from a fear to sacrifice its existence, and so the slave self consciousness is, as the americans would variously say, a loser, a dipshit, a toolbox and many such choice terms of endearment.
however (the "aha!" moment, if you please), there are some problems. (there always are. c'est la vie.) if the slave self consciousness is indeed an object, then what is the worth of the recognition that it provides? what does the master gain by being recognised by an inferior "object"? nothing. the win itself sullies the proof that is sought. the master, very simply put, cannot overcome/transcend its position as it has achieved victory. but this victory is contingent. the master needs the slave to do the work of recognising, yet the slave's recognition is worth nothing. also, by virtue of its postion, the master is dependent on the slave for the fulfillment of the former's desires. bit of a quandry, eh?
for the slave self consciousness, now, there is a pyrrhic victory. (oh how the ghosts of the ancients refuse to depart.) it provides the crucial (!) recognition and so is conscious of the master's dependence on it. but here comes hegel's brilliant sleight of hand. the slave is close to nature through the work that it performs for the master. (nature a.k.a. the object world that surounds the self consciousness) it consumes this nature yes, but in the way of moulding it. the master, with its distance from the actual work, is incapable of directly influencing this nature. so the slave can see the products of its own work, and this reinforces its (guess what) sense of self. also, it has already experienced fear and defeat, so there is a possibility for it to transcend its present position and change. the master can only transcend through death. the master self consciousness cannot afford to change as that, in the hegelian argument, can only be toward a higher position and the master cannot attain a position higher than it already has.
so it is the slave, ultimately, who has the upper hand, and what hegel stops short of advocating, is a passage through slavery for all men. because only after a self consciousness has been enslaved can it then hope to overcome its position of disadvantage and attain a higher position.
i shall not venture into how the unhappy self consciousness comes into being, partly owing to ignorance and mostly to lack of desire. the final solution (funny, innit?) hegel proposes is that the self consciousness becomes only too aware of its unique existence and now desires an unification with "god." (too problematic to define. bugger off.) however, it also realises that it cannot ditch its unique self consciousness (then the whole project fails, non?) and so is rendered unhappy. here hegel, i am sorry to say, fudges and decides that the only way out is for there to be a "priest-like" self consciousness on whom the unhappy consciousness can dump its material glories, achievements, desires and be free for some holy fun and games.
you thought this was bad? just you wait.